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Abstract
In recent years, tremendous attention has been given 
to China’s burgeoning agricultural engagements in Africa. 
Due to limited access to these engagements, most 
discussions have focused on macro-level discourse 
analysis as well as political and economic analysis on its 
impacts. Little research of an anthropological nature has 
been undertaken at the micro-level operation of ongoing 
projects, taking note of the nature of interactions 
between the donors and local counterpart staff within 
a given cultural setting. This article focuses on a Chinese-
Zimbabwe Agricultural Technology Demonstration 
Centre (ATDC) to provide insights into the daily activities, 
interactions and cultural encounters with locals. 
Ethnographic methodologies are used to examine the 
Chinese and Africans’ activities, ideas and dialogues at 
the Demonstration Centre to present through empirical 
observations how China’s macro strategy is implemented 
in actual practices of staff and local partners at the ATDC 
in Zimbabwe.
Keywords: Chinese aid to Africa, Agricultural aid to Africa, 
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre
Introduction
Our Centre is a very complicated institution: We 
have to fulfil the aid tasks of trainings, technology 
demonstration, and receptions for the Chinese 
government; we need to fulfil the business tasks 
to make profit to sustain the Centre; and we also 
have to serve the Zimbabwe government. We have 
three bosses. (Director, Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centre)
Chinese Agricultural Technology Demonstration 
Centres (ATDCs) are designed to be aid programs 
operated by companies. In Zimbabwe, this design 
requires Chinese staff to perform dual roles as aid workers 
and businesspeople, leading to blurred identities and 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a m o n g  C h i n e s e  a c t o r s ,  a n d 
misunderstandings among local Zimbabwean partners. 
In practice, Chinese staff and local partners try to 
overcome these challenges despite limited capacity and 
support, but the inherent design of the ATDC model 
remains a barrier to fully achieving the goal of a financially 
sustainable Centre contributing to increased food 
security. This research aims to provide insight into this 
dilemma through empirical exploration of the ATDC in 
Zimbabwe, based on two months of fieldwork conducted 
over two trips in 2013 and 2014.
China’s increasing engagement with Africa through 
aid, trade and investment is now a well-documented 
trend (Buckley 2013). There has been a growing interest 
in understanding the implications of China’s aid to African 
countries since 2005. This increase in scholarly interest 
derives largely from the concern that China’s brand of 
aid mixed with other financial flows and market dynamics 
potentially negatively impacts economic growth and 
development in Africa (Power et al. 2012). Existing 
research focuses on the motivation of the Chinese 
government, but there is little research into what Chinese 
are actually doing on the ground. Alden (2007) 
summarised three divergent narratives describing China’s 
engagements in Africa as follows: 1) China as coloniser 
and threat to Africa’s development, especially in land 
and resource-related engagements such as agriculture; 
2) China as economic competitor; and 3) China as 
development partner, emphasising the value of China’s 
development experience and opportunities for 
supporting African countries to follow a similar path. 
Chinese political-economic motivations behind aid 
include solidifying and promoting relations with African 
states, and garnering business opportunities. However, 
it is unclear how these motivations are actually playing 
out on the ground through existing agricultural 
engagements. The objective of this research is to present 
how China’s macro strategy is implemented, through 
presentation of empirical observations of the actual 
practices of staff and local partners in the ATDC in 
Zimbabwe.
Our research team consisted of two researchers from 
the China Agriculture University. We lived in the ATDC 
together with eight Chinese staff for two months, 
implementing ethnographic-style participatory 
observation research methodology. We conducted 
unstructured interviews with all Chinese staff, some local 
workers including kitchen cleaners, security guards, 
tractor drivers, fixed agricultural workers and casual 
workers. We also went to Harare to interview Chinese 
embassy staff, staff of the Zimbabwean Ministry of 
Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development 
and managers of other Chinese agricultural companies. 
During our stay at the ATDC, we also observed visits from 
an international aid delegation, a local farmer 
organisation, local commercial farmers and politicians 
and a delegation from MOFCOM. We were involved in 
the preparation for and reception of these visitors, and 
also interviewed them. In addition, upon our return to 
China, we interviewed stakeholders in Beijing from the 
Chinese Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce. All 
interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese or 
English, and no translators were employed. 
Blurred lines between aid and 
business in the model of Chinese 
ATDCs
ATDCs are a new modality for Chinese agricultural aid 
to Africa. They were initiated in Beijing in 2006 at the 
third Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). The ATDCs aim to transfer Chinese agricultural 
technology and development experience to promote 
agricultural development and to resolve food security 
problems in Africa. The operational model of the ATDCs 
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is to employ Chinese companies and institutes, generally 
selected via a competitive tender system in China, to 
build and operate the Centres for at least three years 
under a Chinese grant. During this time the companies 
are encouraged to seek out ways for the Centres to earn 
income and become self-financing. They are also 
encouraged to investigate other business opportunities 
(Bräutigam and Zhang 2013). The host countries provide 
ATDCs with a small farm area for piloting and 
demonstrating Chinese technologies. In practice, the 
companies and institutes manage the farms for modest 
profits to support the operational costs of the Centres 
before they find alternative business opportunities. These 
Centres have been highly sought after by African leaders. 
As a MOFCOM official in Beijing explained in an interview,
After we pledged support to build ten Demonstration 
Centres in Africa at the 2006 FOCAC summit, many 
African countries submitted requests for the 
Centres. As the requests to host these Centres were 
overwhelming, we increased the number of pledged 
Centres from the original 10 to 14, and it is apparent 
that African countries hope that China would build 
one such Centre in each country.
Since its inception that figure has now jumped even 
higher, with 25 such Centres reported to have been built 
by 2013 (Tang 2013).
At the diplomatic level, the ATDC is seen as an 
innovative modality to promote China-Africa agricultural 
cooperation targeting agricultural development in Africa 
through China’s technology and equipment. The Chinese 
government hopes that the ATDC model can break the 
vicious cycle in traditional aid modalities of ‘build-
transfer-suspend-reinvest-retransfer-resuspend’. For this 
reason they have included companies as the operational 
body in the design of the ATDC model. The Centres have 
three requirements: first, they need to attract interest 
and demonstrate the new technology; second, they need 
to have a training component for local peasants; and 
third, they need to be sustainable (Bräutigam and Tang 
2009).
Chinese policymakers acknowledge that using an 
agribusiness model to achieve development aid comes 
with risks and uncertainties, and integrating the 
non-profit and profit-making functions remains a 
challenge (Buckley 2013). Indeed, the Chinese 
government has taken some measures to ensure the 
public services of ATDCs are achieved, such as setting a 
minimum number of trainees to 120 persons per year. 
There are also monitoring and evaluation procedures, 
such as a requirement to submit monthly and annual 
reports to MOFCOM and the Chinese Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA). In 2012, MOFCOM and MOA jointly 
evaluated the performance of the ATDCs in 4 African 
countries, placing equal weight on the economic 
sustainability of operations as on contributions to local 
agricultural development. Further, MOFCOM and MOA 
jointly organised internal discussion workshops in 2012 
and 2013 on how to keep a balance between public 
service and business activities. All ATDCs in Africa were 
required to participate and present their experiences and 
difficulties. The officials from different divisions and 
departments of MOFCOM and MOA, provincial 
governments, China Development Bank, China Export-
Import Bank and China-Africa Development Fund were 
also invited to attend. The senior officials at the meeting 
emphasised both the public services and economic 
sustainability of the ATDCs. 
The ATDC model aims to make foreign aid interventions 
sustainable by linking with commercial opportunities 
for Chinese companies. Under this model, the Chinese 
companies are asked to use the three years of support 
from the Chinese government to explore operating in 
an economically sustainable, commercial and mutually 
beneficial way (Bräutigam and Tang 2013). This means 
that the Centre has dual functions and is required to play 
two roles: as a demonstration Centre, it needs to have 
demonstration and training components to promote 
local agricultural development; while as a company, it 
needs to ensure business profits to sustain operations. 
These two functions seem contradictory from the 
outside; however, they follow an internal logic developed 
in China’s own development experience of employing 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to achieve State goals. 
Indeed, the Centres adopted the Chinese management 
framework of ‘one identical institution under two 
different names’ (一个机构两块牌子), which is a special 
administration and management model employed 
successfully in China in separating Party from government 
work, and separating government from enterprise 
management functions. Under such a management 
structure, when an institution has two names for different 
identities, it uses its appropriate name to meet the work 
needs depending on the context.
Blurring the lines between aid 
and business on the ground in 
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe-China relations date back to Zimbabwe’s 
(then Rhodesia’s) struggle for independence when the 
then main guerrilla movement, the Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU), established links with the Chinese 
Communist Party. Through this linkage, China provided 
arms and other logistical support to the armed struggle. 
Zimbabwe adopted a ‘Look East Policy’ following its 
isolation by the West after embarking on a land reform 
programme in 1999, and held China as an ‘all-weather 
friend’. Reaffirming its friendship with Zimbabwe, China, 
at the request of Zimbabwe, has entered into a number 
of agricultural cooperation programmes, including the 
provision of 4,910t of rice and 9,723t of wheat as 
emergency food aid in 2012; a donation of agricultural 
machinery comprising 10 farm trucks, 30 walking (two 
wheel) tractors and 50 water pumps; a loan agreement 
with the China Export-Import Bank; the training of key 
staff in Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture; and 
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dispatching of Chinese agricultural experts on various 
missions (Mukwereza 2013). China’s leadership sees 
Zimbabwe as among its closest partners, and the country 
was among the first recipients of an ATDC. The Centre in 
Zimbabwe is now one of 25 ATDCs in 24 countries across 
the African continent.
We arrived at the ATDC in Gwebi late in the evening 
after a 25-hour flight directly from Beijing, and a two-hour 
drive from Harare airport. We were greeted by a full 
welcoming banquet thrown by the ten Chinese staff. The 
dining room had a large round table filled with Chinese 
dishes cooked by the staff themselves, using vegetables 
they grew themselves or bought from the local market, 
and African beer and wine. Chatting away in Chinese 
with the staff, surrounded by Chinese furniture and food, 
it felt like we had come on a very long journey and never 
left China. This feeling continued when we went to our 
rooms and saw that everything there was Chinese too: 
the air conditioners, furniture, TVs and electrical outlets. 
They even provided us with Chinese soap, shampoo, 
mosquito repellent and toilet tissue! Before we went to 
Zimbabwe, we expected the living conditions to be 
rough, but it was like a nice Chinese hotel. 
The next morning we woke to find a beautiful Chinese 
garden surrounding a half dozen modern two story 
buildings. They were organised as a dormitory and living 
areas with kitchen and dining room; administrative areas 
with offices, meeting rooms, training rooms and 
laboratories; a harvest processing area, including a 
warehouse and storage; and a shelter for a handful of 
large tractors, combines, harvesters, ploughs, seed 
sowers, pesticide sprayers, a flue-cured tobacco baling 
machine, etc. 
There was a beautiful swimming pool and a local style 
thatched roof barbeque rest area. The most astonishing 
to us was the huge garden with flowers and trees, and 
iron rod fencing allowing passers-by to see through, with 
lights on the paths. In China, our agricultural centres are 
just functional, not beautiful. This place impressed us 
with how clean and organised it was, with everything in 
place. Only Zimbabwe’s national flag fluttering in the 
wind next to the Chinese flag in front of the administrative 
building reminded us that we were actually in Zimbabwe. 
A Chinese agricultural machinery company gained 
the bid for constructing the ATDC in Zimbabwe, and 
started infrastructure construction in 2009. In 2012, China 
and Zimbabwe held a ceremony to officially open the 
Centre following completion of construction. The 
company imported agricultural machines from China to 
run the Demonstration Centre. Some of the machines 
were brought in simply for display, such as the flue-cured 
tobacco baling machine. Others are used for farming 
operations in the field. 
The Demonstration Centre was allocated an area of 
74ha about 300m away from the office and residential 
complex for field operations. Every year, the farm is mainly 
used for potato, soybean and maize cultivation in the 
rainy season and for wheat and potatoes in winter. The 
company dispatched ten Chinese working staff to 
manage the Centre. The Zimbabwean Ministry of 
Agriculture appointed a local management team for the 
Demonstration Centre, and a separate office to support 
their work. The team includes the Director and Deputy 
Director of the Department of Agricultural Education and 
Training, Deputy Director of the Department of 
Agricultural Mechanisation and Engineering, and the 
Principal of Gwebi Agricultural College. ‘To be specific,’ 
explained one ATDC staff member, ‘relying on the 
Demonstration Centre, we registered an agricultural 
company which shares the same working staff and 
management personnel with the Centre. The company 
uses the Centre’s name when it performs the function 
of public services, and adopts the company’s name when 
it conducts commercial operations.’ 
According to our field research, during its operation 
over the past year, the Demonstration Centre has carried 
out the following public service activities: First, pilot 
demonstration, including the experimental cultivation 
of nearly 20 kinds of local maize seeds in cooperation 
with local seed companies, the experimental cultivation 
of a dozen varieties of potatoes jointly with domestic 
potato research institutes and the promotion of diced 
potato cultivation technology; second, agricultural 
exhibition and presentation, including presenting 
agricultural machinery at various agricultural shows held 
in the country under the auspices of the Zimbabwean 
Ministry of Agriculture; third, receiving visiting 
delegations, including students of Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural colleges; and fourth, organising trainings. 
The Centre successively trained a group of farmers on 
agricultural machinery as well as a farmers’ group whose 
membership was drawn from a local potato farmers’ 
association. 
By contrast, the activities for the business operations 
include the following: First, sales of agricultural machinery. 
They have contracted several local middlemen and 
displayed some small machinery in the local 
businessmen’s yards. They maintain contact with local 
farmer organisations to give them advice on using their 
solar irrigation and electricity systems. They would also 
like to participate in trade fairs to introduce users to their 
machinery. Thus far, their machinery business has not 
performed well. Second, sales of agricultural products 
of the farm, including maize, soybean, wheat and potato. 
The agricultural production from the farm is an important 
source of income for them. Most of their agricultural 
products are sold to local food companies and sometimes 
some local farmers also come to buy some potato for 
eating. Third, providing contract ploughing services to 
local commercial farmers, covering a total area of 1,333ha. 
In Zimbabwe local farmers seldom have large agricultural 
machinery, including tractors. So they invite the centre 
to plough and harvest their land in return for payment. 
In the Chinese policy framework, the ATDC model of 
‘one institute with two roles’ is seen as a solution to 
perceived problems of the predominant Western aid 
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model as well as China’s past aid projects in Africa. The 
aim is to avoid the unsustainability of purely government-
financed public aid projects that so many Chinese aid 
projects have encountered in Africa. At the same time, 
this model aims to avoid a focus on maximum profit 
capture seen in pure free-market private enterprises. In 
China’s domestic transition, this model has gained 
success, and has also shown promise abroad through 
initial pilots by Chinese state-owned enterprises at Koba 
farm in Guinea and in Mozambique (Bräutigam and Tang 
2013). In practice, this model requires Chinese staff to 
perform dual roles as aid workers and businesspeople. 
The model is leading to blurred identities and expectations 
among Chinese actors, and misunderstandings among 
local Zimbabwean partners. 
In the ATDC aid model, the Chinese staff perform dual 
roles as aid workers and businesspeople due to the two 
identities attached to their single institute. In practice, 
the Chinese staff change their roles according to the 
situation they meet. As one ATDC staff member explained, 
When we sell agricultural products and collect 
accounts receivable, we introduce ourselves as 
employees of the agriculture company; when we 
take part in activities such as exhibitions, or hold 
trainings, we introduce ourselves as from the 
Demonstration Centre. In such a way, we’ll not feel 
embarrassed [about our sometimes contradictory 
roles].
The performance of dual roles as aid workers and 
businesspeople has blurred the workers’ sense of identity, 
leading to conflicting working expectations among 
Chinese staff and misunderstandings among local 
Zimbabwean partners. In practice, Chinese staff and local 
partners try to overcome these challenges despite limited 
capacity and support, but the inherent design of the 
ATDC model remains a barrier to fully achieving the goal 
of a financially sustainable Centre contributing to 
increased food security.
Blurred roles of Chinese staff at 
the ATDC
China has not yet built up a professional development 
industry and systematic development education system. 
De Haan (2011) writes that development studies as a 
subject did not emerge in (mainland) China until recently, 
with currently ongoing efforts to build development 
studies within agricultural universities. There are no 
consistent systems for training development workers 
prior to deployment on ATDC and other aid postings. 
These aid workers are dispatched by companies and most 
of them have no experience in development aid. This 
was the case with the eight Chinese staff at the 
Zimbabwean Centre. Before they came to Zimbabwe, 
two of them worked as managers on a Chinese state 
farm; three others came directly from obtaining bachelors’ 
degrees from an agricultural university; and the rest 
worked in various non-agricultural companies. Most of 
them had received high levels of training in agriculture, 
especially in agricultural mechanisation. However, none 
of the staff received any training on development aid 
before being recruited and deployed to Zimbabwe. 
Furthermore, only four of the eight staff were skilled in 
English, with three having no English knowledge at all. 
‘We attended training in agricultural economics, 
agricultural machinery, plant protection, accountancy, 
international regulations and potato planting,’ explained 
an ATDC staff member. ‘Before we came here, one person 
who had spent for two months here introduced the 
Centre to us in one day.’ Beyond this basic orientation, 
the staff had to figure the rest of the job out on their own 
after they arrived. 
The complex working arrangements inherent to the 
ATDC model have caused mixed reactions to the Centre. 
Table 1 above illustrates the mixed professional 
backgrounds and blurred workload distribution of 
Chinese staff in the ATDC. In interviews, the Chinese staff 
reflected on the challenges of their dual roles. ‘Our Centre 
is a very complicated institution,’ explained one staff 
member. ‘We have to fulfil the aid tasks of trainings, 
technology demonstration, and receptions for the 
Chinese government; we need to fulfil the business tasks 
to make profit to sustain the Centre; and we also have 
to serve the Zimbabwean government. We are pressed 
under three mountains.’  Under these three mountains, 
the Chinese staff have to try to balance their inputs for 
the varying functions of the ATDC. 
Due to the different positions of staff within the ATDC, 
as well as their different ages and motivations, they have 
diverse perceptions of their dual roles. The Director 
attaches more importance to the sustainability of the 
ATDC and emphasises his responsibility to seek business 
opportunities. ‘The Chinese government only finances 
the initial three years, but we have promised to maintain 
this Centre for decades. So we have to try our best to 
capture more business opportunities,’ he explained. ‘It is 
not easy to find them. What we do is to try to see profits 
from the farmland while cutting operational costs as 
much as possible. We are cooperating with Gwebi 
Agricultural College in trainings, and investing in 
developing their farm so that we can share some profits. 
We also try to sell our agricultural machinery and offer 
paid services, such as we rent our tractors and heavy 
plough to prepare land for cultivation to local commercial 
farms.’ During field work, the director always works 
towards this overall goal, as we can see from this snapshot 
of one week in his working diary, as observed in our 
fieldwork:
February 17: Delivered potatoes to a local potato 
chips manufacturing company in the morning, dealt 
with the Centre’s computer network failures and 
accounts with the telecommunications company 
at noon, and picked up a research group from the 
airport in the afternoon. 
February 18: Made nameplates for the farm’s test 
sites in the office in the morning; guided farm 
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workers to sort potatoes in the operating area; 
visited China Tobacco International Inc. to discuss 
cooperation in project declaration; then purchased 
the mower at a shopping centre and talked about 
relevant issues on prospects for investment in 
Zambia with a broker at the entrance of a large 
supermarket.
February 19: Sprayed lacquer on the nameplates 
made yesterday, cleared up the instrument room of 
the demonstration Centre, updated the company’s 
financial records in the afternoon, dealt with the 
employment information of temporary workers and 
calculated wages and social insurance, and farming 
payrolls; produced the training video. 
February 20: Arranged farm for workers to sort 
potatoes, put the labels of test species at respective 
plots in the field during the morning; updated 
the company’s financial records around noon, 
purchased food and daily necessities for the Centre 
from the supermarket, summed up the potato test 
results and sent the information to the domestic 
market in the afternoon.
February 21: Arranged local workers to clean 
the park and sorted the presentation materials 
of the Centre on the morning; accompanied the 
Minister, Director General and Permanent Secretary 
of Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture on a joint 
inspection of the Centre with General Manager 
Jiang, served as an interpreter in the afternoon.
In his day-to-day work, the ATDC director drafts new 
project proposals, evaluates potential cooperative farms, 
negotiates with other agricultural companies, analyses 
local machinery needs, etc. We can see that he places 
little emphasis on the public functions of ATDC. Indeed, 
the manager explained that the business side of the ATDC 
is his focus because that is his experience and he lacks 
guidance on any other way to operate. ‘The Centre is a 
quite new modality for Chinese aid and nobody knows 
how best to manage it. Our company has no experience 
and we also cannot learn from other Centres because 
we are all in same situation. We only know how to manage 
the farm and how to repair agricultural machinery. We 
were required to keep the Centre running and for that 
we can do what we can.’ The salary arrangements of the 
ATDC also encourage the director to focus on business 
over aid because his salary is paid by the company which 
contracted to operate this Centre directly and not by the 
Centre. ‘My bonus and subsistence,’ he explained, ‘depend 
directly on the profits of the ATDC.’ The director and vice 
director both took the ATDC job after already retiring 
from successful careers. They see the ATDC as a good 
opportunity to do something extra and interesting. As 
 Table 1: Personal and professional profiles of Chinese staff at the Centre in Zimbabwe
Name Sex Educational 
background
Working experience 
in China
English skill Working position 
in the Centre
Working position in the 
agricultural company
G.M. Jiang M BSc in agricultural
machinery
Retired manager of a 
state-owned farm
Non-English 
speaking
Director General of 
the Demonstration
 Centre
General Manager of the 
agricultural company, 
Manager of the Project 
Dept.
Mr. Yu M BSc in agricultural 
machinery
Retired vice manager 
of a state-owned farm
Skilled Deputy Director 
General
Deputy General Manager
Mr. Liu M Senior school Driver Primary Staff of the Training 
Dept.
Head of the Sales Dept.
Mr. Ju M Senior school Kitchener in a company Non-English 
speaking
Head of the 
Integrated 
Management Dept.
Head of the Integrated 
Management Dept.
Miss Hao F Secondary school; 
specialised in
accountancy
Accountant Non-English 
speaking
Financial Manager Financial Manager
Xiao Wang M BSc in horticulture Bachelor student Skilled Staff of the Production 
Dept. and Training 
Dept.
Staff of the Project Dept., 
Produc tion Dept. , 
Integrated Management 
Dept. and Financial Dept.
Xiao Yang M BSc in agricultural 
machinery
Bachelor student Skilled Staff of the Training 
Dept. and the 
Integrated 
Management Dept.
Staff of the Sales Dept. 
and the I ntegrated 
Management Dept.
Xiao Li M BSc in international 
trade
Bachelor student Skilled Staff of the Training 
Dept. and the 
Integrated 
Management Dept.
Staff of the Project Dept., 
the Integrated 
Management Dept. and 
the Sales Dept. 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork
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they see it, they can continue to earn their retirement 
earnings in China, while also making some money 
through the business ventures in the ATDC. The Centre 
can keep 30 percent of profits from its business activities 
as bonuses for Chinese working staff. Therefore, they are 
focusing more on the business side of the ATDC’s dual 
identity. 
The three young Chinese staff have rather different 
perceptions about their work at ATDC. They want to 
become professional aid workers. They explained that 
when they were hired, they were told that they would 
come to Zimbabwe to do a Chinese aid project. When 
they arrived, fresh out of university and with good English 
language skills, they were disappointed to find that there 
was a lot of criticism about the profit motives of the ATDC. 
Furthermore, their strong English skills allow them to 
interact with international aid workers, and they 
described a sense of jealousy that this kind of profession 
doesn’t exist in China. ‘I met some aid workers from US. 
They worked with farmers directly and they look very 
professional and know clearly what they are doing,’ said 
one of the three. These younger staff members cannot 
change the situation, and feel frustrated that they have 
to follow the company’s arrangement. ‘Surely we are 
aware that the Centre is a grant-aid project, but we are 
hired by a company,’ explained one staff member. ‘The 
company should place more importance on the mission 
of the Centre and the aid tasks when it allocates tasks to 
us. I don’t see the leaders considering the national 
mission and aid goals. Instead,’ he continued, ‘I am stuck 
dealing with the minutiae of our daily lives and the farm 
operations. If I don’t go to buy vegetables from local 
market, we have no food for lunch. This is our reality. It 
has no relationship with the national strategy or the 
mission of the ATDC.’ 
Sometimes, these young workers complain and resist 
the leaders’ arrangements for the for-profit aspects of 
the project. One of them explained his complicated 
emotions as dual roles: 
I have no special emotion to the company which 
we registered here. I always introduced I came from 
the Chinese ATDC when I met others. When I sell 
potatoes or machinery I feel very discomfortable. 
When I prepared for training course and hosted a 
delegation for the ATDC I felt very relaxed and happy. 
Sometimes the resistance is quite subtle. For example, 
we observed passive resistance during the internal 
workshop to develop the annual work plans. When the 
directors explained the potential projects and working 
tasks to all participants, the young Chinese staff remained 
silent and did not take notes or express their opinions. 
These frustrations made them especially open and 
interested in talking with us as researchers – discussing 
together what the future of the ATDC could be, and 
exploring whether there is a better model for operations. 
The dual roles of the ATDC design thus create tensions 
among the staff themselves, as they take on different 
roles according to their background, skills and interests. 
On the surface, they are a cooperative team with a 
common goal, but in practice, they may resist aspects 
of the dual role demanded of them. 
In addition to the different motivations and 
expectations among Chinese staff, the dual identity of 
the ATDC creates confusion and conflicting expectations 
among others, and has led to negative perception and 
feedback from both the Chinese government and local 
partners. The manager of the ATDC explained, 
In recent years, we received so many criticisms 
from the Counselor’s office and the Ministry. Some 
officials say the Centre is a white elephant. We are 
hurt by these comments. We have done a lot of 
training, but we do not know how to publicise our 
work because we are not professional trainers.
Lacking professional knowledge and skills on aid 
programmes, they do not endeavour to communicate 
with both local partners and the Chinese Counselor’s 
office. For example, they have failed to submit required 
working reports to the Counselor’s office’s requirements 
and do not discuss budget or working-plans with local 
partners. One Chinese staff member explained how his 
previous work experience in China left him ill prepared 
for the tasks expected at the Centre. ‘I was a farm head 
in China and I knew how to manage a farm. Here I have 
to work as training unit head and I have no knowledge 
or experience, especially in Zimbabwe. And nobody can 
supervise me.’ Without training in development aid, the 
staff have had to learn by doing. ‘We have accumulated 
some experience,’ explained the ATDC manager, ‘and we 
now have some basic knowledge about training. Hence 
we have hired a local farm manager to let our staff 
concentrate on training and piloting.’ This ad-hoc, 
learning-by-doing approach to the aid duties of the ATDC 
has been a key reason for the misunderstandings from 
different Chinese actors and local partners. 
Blurred expectations of different 
Chinese actors
The official rhetoric surrounding the ATDC focuses 
primarily on its aid identity and this rhetoric is carried 
down to the country level, with Chinese officials in 
Zimbabwe. At the opening ceremony of the ATDC, for 
example, the Chinese embassy representatives 
emphasised how the ATDC was a symbol of China and 
Zimbabwe’s friendship under the FOCAC framework, and 
described how it would serve as an important platform 
for agro-technology sharing. In practice, the requirement 
for ATDCs to be sustainable entitles them to bear the 
function of promoting enterprises to go global. At the 
Seminar on the Sustainable Development of 
Demonstration Centres, held in Beijing in 2013, one 
government official explained that, 
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It is risky to invest in overseas agriculture because 
the investment is high and the payback period 
is long. Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce 
and the Ministry of Agriculture designed [the 
dual aid-business] mechanism [for the ATDCs]. 
In the project construction period and technical 
cooperation stage, the government provides a set 
amount of funds for project implementers to look 
for powerful experienced enterprises to jointly 
promote Chinese agricultural enterprises to go 
global. The Demonstration Centre is the bridgehead 
and window for Chinese agricultural enterprises to 
go global, and thus provides an opportunity for the 
enterprises that are willing to go global. 
However, he also emphasised that the Demonstration 
Centres must base these business ventures on solid 
technology. 
Many domestic agricultural technologies [in China] 
have a history of a few decades or even more than 
one thousand years. These technologies are needed 
abroad. We need to push forward the promotion of 
these technologies and boost the development of 
Demonstration Centres on this basis. It is doubtful 
that the Demonstration Centres could develop well 
and achieve commercialised operation without 
solid technology. Some Demonstration Centres and 
construction units engage in agricultural trading, 
agricultural technology sales and even real estate 
development, but these can only be sideline business 
of Demonstration Centres.
Thus, under China’s policy framework, although the 
Demonstration Centre has the function to promote 
enterprises to go global, its core function is to demonstrate 
and promote China’s agricultural technologies. During 
his visit to China’s ATDC in Zimbabwe, former Minister 
of Commerce Chen Deming pointed out that: ‘The central 
must appropriately develop breeding industry and 
introduce China’s biogas technology or farmers’ small-
scale biogas digesters technology to Zimbabwe because 
this country has good weather conditions.’ He continued, 
‘We are also considering introducing China’s agricultural 
machinery maintenance technology here to support the 
maintenance of agricultural machinery in Zimbabwe.’ 
Another senior official on this visit similarly emphasised 
that although the sustainability of the Centre’s commercial 
operations was very important, the Chinese government 
never intended to build up the ATDC as commercial 
farmland using grant aid resources. 
Despite the official rhetoric placing equal emphasis 
on both the commercial and public service roles of the 
ATDC in theory, in practice in Zimbabwe, the Economic 
and Commercial Counselor’s Office criticises the Centre 
for shifting its priorities to business: ‘They pay too much 
attention to business now, and invest few resources in 
aid work. We have reminded them several times, but they 
tend to forget to organise training courses without our 
reminders.’ 
While the Chinese government criticises the ATDC for 
being too business oriented, Chinese businesses in 
Zimbabwe criticise it for being too limited in its business 
scope. At the time of our research, eight Chinese 
agricultural companies had investments in Zimbabwe’s 
agriculture sector. They had imported agricultural 
machinery from China, but faced challenges when these 
machines needed repair, as there were no services 
available and spare parts had to be brought from China 
at high cost. When the ATDC was getting established, 
they saw that it was to be run by an agricultural machinery 
company, and thus expected that it would be able to 
provide spare parts and machine maintenance service. 
As the manager of one company explained, 
I heard from the embassy that the agricultural 
machinery company would construct and operate 
the ATDC. I was very happy because we really 
need spare parts and maintenance service on our 
machines. I went to the ATDC to say hello to the 
director. I hoped they could offer this service to us.
According to the bilateral agreements between China 
and Zimbabwe, however, the Centre is not permitted to 
repair agricultural machinery. The Centre did import 
some agricultural machines for its own purposes in 
developing and running the demonstration farm; 
however, it does not have the means or authority within 
the agreement to import machine parts, sell them, or 
conduct maintenance services on external machines. 
When Chinese agriculture companies needed spare parts 
and came to ATDC to find them, the Centre was not able 
to meet their demands. ‘When I saw that so many tractors 
and other machines were exhibited at the Centre,’ recalled 
another agribusiness manager, ‘I thought it should offer 
agriculture machine sale and maintenance services. But 
I found I was wrong; they cannot do this.’ 
Though the Centre is seeking a local market for its 
agricultural machinery, at present the local farmers only 
express interest in the small and cheap machinery. The 
modern and large machinery displayed in the Centre is 
mainly for demonstration purposes and for its own 
agricultural production; the image it conveys leads to 
misunderstanding by non-Chinese as well. For example, 
international aid workers visited the farm during our 
research. They saw the large machinery and also thought 
that it was for promoting the sale of Chinese agricultural 
machines. They interpreted the ATDC as a ‘big commercial 
farm’ and assumed that its main purpose was to promote 
big Chinese agricultural investments. In their discussions 
with ATDC staff, they emphasised that these machines 
were suitable for commercial production and not for 
small scale farmers, and they expressed concern over 
the implications of these Chinese machines becoming 
available in Zimbabwe.
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Blurred expectations from 
Zimbabwean partners
The Zimbabwean partners also have different 
expectations for the ATDC.
 
Top officials view the ATDC as promoting close links 
with the Chinese government. As mentioned earlier, 
China is not establishing ATDCs in every African country. 
The ATDC has symbolic relevance, showing close China-
Africa relations in those countries that are recipients. High 
officials involved in ATDCs gain political capital through 
engaging with China and developing close relationships 
with the Chinese government. They regard the Chinese 
ATDCs as an aid program, benefiting their agricultural 
sector and promoting food security following China’s 
success domestically. For example, the Minister of 
Agriculture has visited China five times and is impressed 
by China’s agricultural development performance. He 
expects great benefits from the ATDC’s goal of sharing 
Chinese agricultural technology with Zimbabweans. As 
he explained in an interview, 
The ATDC is very important and very unique 
and special. The Centre can exhibit agricultural 
machines, and farmers can visit and access to 
these machines, and they can learn to use them. 
I hope the Centre can be cultivated as a Centre of 
trainers. The agricultural technicians, teachers and 
students in colleges and officials can come here 
to be trained and then they can continue to train 
farmers in different areas. For example, the Centre 
is piloting new cultivating methods of potato, and 
potato harvesting machines. I think this is quite 
good. Potato is transferred from food crop to cash 
crop in Zimbabwe because potato chips are now 
very popular. The traditional potato variety and 
technology cannot match current processing 
needs. I heard that there was one farmer who came 
from 300km away to see the potato planting and 
machines here. I am very glad to know this.
In addition to direct political prestige, high officials 
also expect to gain additional support from China via 
the ATDC platform. When the Chinese Minister of 
Commence came to visit the ATDC, the Zimbabwean 
Minister of Agriculture came one day prior to check 
preparations, and the next day he showed up two hours 
early to ensure he would arrive before the Chinese 
Minister. Furthermore, the Minister required all division 
heads in the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture to come 
to the ATDC to welcome the Chinese Minister. They took 
great efforts to present their hospitability and their 
support to ATDC and to promote China’s continued 
engagements in Zimbabwe. ‘We hope China can offer 
more support to our country,’ explained the Minister in 
an interview. ‘China could build up a special economic 
zone here, like in Ethiopia. Chinese agricultural companies 
can invest in this economic zone. We also hope China 
can help us to develop our dairy, meat cattle, poultry, 
pig and fresh-water fish.’ He continued, ‘We hope China 
can help us to extend value chain of agricultural products, 
such as food processing, seedling, leather and other 
subsidiary agricultural products processing. We also hope 
China can help us to improve rural infrastructure and 
telecom development.’ 
The Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture has appointed 
four officials to jointly deal with ATDC affairs. They work 
with Chinese staff directly and have their own 
expectations for the ATDC. They not only hope to gain 
more support from China, but also to promote the ATDC 
as an international training centre available for use by 
other donors. They work to present their capacity to 
manage China’s aid programmes well, proving their 
capacity to cooperate similarly with other donors. During 
our research, they were busy preparing for a visit by a 
Western aid delegation. They discussed the visiting 
schedule and route carefully with the Chinese staff, and 
introduced the different buildings, instruments, functions 
and activities of the ATDC to the delegation. When they 
found that the Chinese staff were unable to present 
clearly in English, they stepped in and explained the 
workings of the ATDC, and responded to questions and 
confusion from the delegation. ‘The Centre owns a 
classroom, laboratory, pilot farm and agricultural 
machines,’ explained the deputy division head to the 
delegation. ‘Farmers can come here for training. Not only 
China can organise training programmes here but other 
donors can come to use it as well. The Centre can offer 
training materials, and international donors can pay for 
the farmers’ expenditures including transportation and 
accommodation.’ After the delegation left, he told 
researchers, ‘You can see that the Centre is very attractive 
to international donors. They may be considering leaving 
and not continuing their aid programmes in our country. 
But then they come to visit the Centre and they are 
considering staying in Zimbabwe.’ 
Due to the positive expectations towards the ATDC, 
the local partners cooperate well with Chinese staff and 
also try their best to solve difficulties they have 
encountered. The Chinese staff reflected,
They have really helped us a lot. They help in 
contacting people; making arrangements for us to 
participate in local agricultural exhibitions where 
we have presented our agricultural machinery; 
contacting local seed companies and making 
arrangements for us to try out the varieties available 
locally. The Ministry of Agriculture also invited us 
to visit a local farm on our opening day so that we 
could learn how to conduct farm demonstrations; 
they also invited Gwebi Agricultural College to 
hold trainings jointly with us. Whenever we hold 
a training session, their officials are present and 
deliver opening and closing remarks.
Thus the personal and political benefits of interacting 
with the Chinese through the ATDC has created a positive 
sense of collaboration on both sides.
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Despite positive collaboration among the higher level 
officials, the dual roles of Chinese staff and inherent 
requirements of the ATDC model do lead to 
misunderstandings by local Zimbabwean partners. These 
stem from their personal motivations for involvement 
in ATDC administration as well as their personal 
perceptions of the model. 
The ATDC’s Zimbabwean government partners see 
themselves as co-managers, but also as aid recipients, 
and they expect payment from the Chinese. In China, 
government officials involved in international aid 
programs offered by donors within China are paid by 
the Chinese government and are not allowed to get 
additional payment from that aid work. The Chinese thus 
expect that the Zimbabwean partners should be paid 
by the Zimbabwean government. Local partners do not 
understand this expectation from the Chinese side. They 
perceive that the Chinese government has provided 
Zimbabwe with a three-year technical cooperation 
assistance programme. They expect that Zimbabwe, as 
the host government, should have full discretion in how 
the funds are used. ‘In the past six months, we did not 
work as one team,’ explained a local partner who is from 
the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture. 
The Chinese government sent money, but we do not 
know how much was sent. We need to know. I drive 
my car to the Centre for a joint job. Nobody pays 
for the fuel. All vehicles provided for the Centre are 
used by Chinese team only; we never use them. It 
is not fair driving my own car for work at the Centre 
with no reimbursement for fuel expenses. We are not 
special managers for the Centre; we simply spend 
some of our working time working for the Centre. 
The ministry does not pay us for work done at the 
Centre so the Centre should pay us instead.
Obviously, the local partners think that they are 
co-managers and they are entitled to some funding from 
the Chinese government. Chinese staff take the position 
that they came to Zimbabwe to help and will not pay a 
partner for its contribution. With this logic, the Chinese 
director explained that the Zimbabwean government 
only provided scheduled consultations on an ‘as-needed’ 
basis. ‘When we contact the government,’ he explained 
‘they offer assistance. We share our plan with them and 
they may make suggestions. They need to pay [their own 
staff ] for this involvement.’ These misunderstandings 
have induced conflicts between local partners and 
Chinese staff. The local partners have thus reduced the 
frequency of their visits to the Centre. 
The other blurred expectation of local partners stems 
from their perceptions of the ATDC’s core function. As 
mentioned earlier, they attach more importance to the 
ATDC’s public function. They don’t understand the 
intention of the sustainability goal in the ATDC model, 
so they do not understand why Chinese staff focus so 
much on how to enlarge the farmland and seek more 
business opportunities. This leads to suspicions about 
their ‘real motivations’ in Zimbabwe. As one official from 
the Zimbabwean Ministry of Agriculture explained, ‘They 
should know clearly why they came to our country. They 
should have training plans. They cannot only focus on 
commercial production. If they came here for planting 
potato, maize and soybean, and only want to manage a 
thousand-hectare farm, they were totally wrong.’ As 
explained earlier, the real motivation for the staff needing 
to expand the farm is the responsibility to develop 
economically sustainable operations to support the 
functioning of the Centre. As one Chinese staff member 
explained, ‘Presently we are encountering no financial 
problems, but the situation could change when funding 
from the Chinese government stops. We have to try to 
make profits to maintain the Centre through exploring 
business opportunities. As mentioned at the start, the 
Centre needs about US$2m per year to cover salaries, 
infrastructure servicing, training, vehicles and general 
maintenance; however, it currently only makes 
US$180,000. One option that was proposed by the 
Chinese staff was that they could try to ensure their 
economic sustainability by enlarging their plot of land 
to produce more food for sale on the local market. At 
present they are working with 74ha of land, but they 
estimate that if it can be enlarged to at least 600ha then 
they will be able to maintain the Centre from those profits. 
However, they have faced difficulties convincing their 
Zimbabwean counterparts to grant them the extra 526ha. 
The Chinese staff have made efforts to improve the 
relationship and have adopted some informal means to 
do so. ‘Treating them to dinner’ and ‘gifts’ – two means 
to maintain a relationship – have played a positive role. 
When the former Director of the Centre shared his work 
experience, he stressed the need to periodically invite 
the local counterpart staff to dinner to establish a 
friendship. ‘We often invite the officials of the Ministry 
of Agriculture to drink tea or have dinner together,’ 
explained the Chinese director, ‘and we visit them on 
New Year’s Day and other holidays or give them some 
gifts. It is very useful.’ Chocolates, corn meal and fertiliser 
are also well-received gifts. Chinese and Zimbabwean 
festivals are similarly good occasions for gift exchange, 
and Chinese restaurants have become the most 
important places for treating local partners to dinners. 
In addition, the Centre also strives to maintain good 
relations with the officials through joint development 
of farms and contract farming. The Centre was once in a 
poor relationship with Gwebi Agricultural College, so it 
ploughed 100ha of land jointly with the college. ‘We 
made little money from the 100ha of land. We did that 
to maintain a good relationship with Gwebi Agricultural 
College. After all, the Centre is on their property,’ explained 
the Chinese director. ‘We do not charge government 
officials for ploughing and harvesting work done on their 
fields. We develop farms jointly with officials. The purpose 
is to build a good relationship with them rather than to 
make money.’ With these efforts, the local officials 
sometimes reciprocate and use their own initiative to 
secure fuel to come for joint activities at the Centre; and 
rarely request reimbursements from the Centre. ‘They 
are really kind,’ explained one Chinese staff member. 
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‘When we encounter troubles with visas, labour and other 
issues they always try their best to help us promptly. Last 
time when the Chinese government team came to 
evaluate our work, the Ministry of Agriculture gave us a 
lot of good comments.’
Furthermore, the Centre has recruited 21 workers 
locally; among them eight tractor drivers, six security 
guards, four general farm hands and three gardeners. To 
relieve the Chinese staff of the pressures of managing 
fieldwork, in 2014 the Centre recruited a farm manager 
from the host country. During the peak farming season, 
the Centre generally hires an additional 100 workers for 
planting, weeding and harvesting. These interactions 
also reveal the complications spurred by the dual identity 
of the ATDC. In Zimbabwe, different salary scales are set 
for different sectors and salary scales in the government 
are among the highest, while those in the agricultural 
sector are the lowest. Local workers perceive the Centre 
as a government program, so assume they should receive 
higher ‘official’ salaries. According to our research, most 
local workers feel their salaries are too low because they 
understand they are working for a Chinese aid agency 
whose salary scale should at least equal that of civil 
servants in Zimbabwe. At the time of commencing 
operations, the Chinese staff were unaware of the 
position regarding salary scales for different categories 
of workers, and they fixed the lowest salary at US$170/
month based on the category for general farm hands. 
This was the then minimum wage in government. ‘During 
the first three years of infrastructure construction,’ 
explained a Chinese staff person, ‘the Centre was a 
grant-aid project and we did pay local workers salary 
according to public sector wages. But now the situation 
has changed and it is the company running the Centre, 
and all local workers have been hired by the company, 
not the Centre. So we have to change the nature of 
employees’ contract and fix their salary at the level of 
agricultural workers.’ Thus the ‘one institute with two roles’ 
model of ATDC leads to confusion among local farm 
workers, and creates dissatisfaction. According to our 
Chinese informants, because they are not satisfied with 
their income they do not work hard. They have reportedly 
even occasionally tried to compensate for their low 
wages by stealing potatoes, soybean and other farm 
goods. 
Conclusion
Through the Agricultural Technology Demonstration 
Centre model, the Chinese aim to promote the recipient 
country to increase grain yield, improve access to 
agricultural technology and enhance food security. The 
Chinese assistance through ATDCs aims to establish a 
platform for enterprises to develop in Africa, accelerating 
agriculture’s process of going global and promoting 
sustainability of development aid projects. Chinese 
ATDCs are thus designed to be aid programs operated 
by companies. 
In Zimbabwe, this design requires Chinese staff to 
perform dual roles as aid workers and business people. 
They are required to seek out potential business 
opportunities, enlarge the scale of farmland and expand 
the domain of their activities. At the same time they have 
to organise demonstrations, exhibitions and trainings. 
Imbalances of their inputs on aid and business lead to 
blurred identities as aid workers and businesspeople. 
These identities lean more one way or the other 
depending on the workers’ own age, position and 
educational background. These mixed roles create 
blurred expectations among Chinese actors, and 
misunderstandings among local Zimbabwean partners. 
Different actors engage with the ATDC’s operations and 
bring different pressures to the model and to the Chinese 
staff running it. The Chinese staff struggle to meet the 
expectations from these actors. In practice, Chinese staff 
and local partners try to overcome these challenges 
despite limited capacity and support, but the inherent 
design of the ATDC model remains a barrier to fully 
achieving the goal of a financially sustainable Centre 
contributing to increased food security. 
The blurred lines between aid and business have been 
embedded in China’s aid projects. This model contrasts 
with Western aid models. The difference comes from 
China’s domestic development experience and 
continuous review of development aid. This article does 
not provide evidence to prove that Chinese aid provided 
through ATDCs is a more effective delivery mode than 
that used by traditional Western donors. However, China’s 
contributions to international aid and development 
thorough the ATDCs provide new insights into a field 
where the perfect aid arrangement remains elusive. 
China’s aid approach is unique and will inevitably 
undergo modifications through the numerous reviews 
it continues to be subjected to. Chinese engagement 
worldwide has been anchored in its espoused principles 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign 
countries as well as non-conditionality of aid. The case 
of the country’s aid to Zimbabwe through the ATDC has 
presented new paradigms of micro-project operation, 
interaction and cooperation with locals. 
End Notes
1 This research is co-funded by the China and Brazil 
in African Agriculture (CBAA) project, China 
International Development Research Network 
(CIDRN) research funding and Beijing Youth Elite 
Programme.
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